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FMC CORP. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
AN OVEREXPANSION OF "OPERATOR" LIABILITY
UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
A primary goal of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 1 is to
place the "burden of cleanup on parties responsible for creating or
worsening an environmental problem."2 Cleanup of hazardous
waste sites is the statute's top priority.3 Furthermore, courts con-
sider CERCLA a remedial statute, and therefore, construe it liber-
ally to effectuate its goals, 4 particularly the goal of responsible
parties bearing the cost of cleanup.5 As a result, courts have
broadly interpreted the scope of "owner" and "operator" liability.6
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. CPC Int'l Inc. v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 571 (W.D. Mich.
1991). See also H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6125. Congress stated: "It is the intent of the Committee in [CER-
CLA] ... to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mecha-
nism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." Id.
3. In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA to address the remediation of contam-
inated hazardous waste sites and to determine who should pay for the cleanup of
those sites. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (providing for liability); United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
957 (1991).
4. See B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In CER-
CIA Congress enacted a broad remedial statute designed to enhance the authority
of the EPA to respond effectively and promptly to toxic pollutant spills .... ");
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.
1989) (describing CERCLA as a "broad response and reimbursement statute").
5. See Dedham Water, 805 F.2d at 1081 (stating "those responsible for the
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsi-
bility for remedying the harmful conditions they created"); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Azrael, 765 F.
Supp. 1239, 1245 (D. Md. 1991); A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABtLITY ACT OF 1980, SENATE
COMMITTEE OF ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORS, S. Doc. No. 97-14, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. Vol. I 320 (1983) (stating a principal goal is "assuring that those who
caused chemical harm bear the costs of that harm .... ").
6. CERCLA § 101 (20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (A). CERCLA defines "owner
or operator" as:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating or chartering by
demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case
of any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated or otherwise
controlled activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandon-
(157)
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By employing such a broad definition of "owner" and "operator,"
courts have been able to impose CERCLA liability on such parties as
parent and sister corporations, 7 corporate officers,8 lessees, 9 plant
ment, (iv) in the case of any facility, tide or control of which was con-
veyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or
similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who
owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility imme-
diately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indica of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id. § 101(20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A).
Generally, CERCLA case law demonstrates a trend toward interpreting the
scope of § 107 liability broadly. See, e.g., Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, 761 F. Supp.
345, 350 (D.NJ. 1991). In determining liability, many courts have taken a func-
tional approach, asking whether a party exercised control over a particular site,
instead of limiting liability to those who actually engaged in the operation of the
site and disposal of the waste. See, e.g., Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (imposing liability
on parent corporation as "operator" due to its "active involvement in the activities
of the subsidiary"); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373,
1382 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that if there is control, ownership, or possession it
does not necessarily follow that liability will attach); United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[i]t is the
authority to control the handling and disposal of hazardous substances that is criti-
cal under the statutory scheme [of CERCLA]"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
7. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, (3d Cir.
1993) (stating a corporation may be held liable as "owner" under CERCLA for
actions of its subsidiary corporation in situations where piercing corporate veil has
been determined to be warranted); John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d
401 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating a successor corporation in merger situation and parent
corporation (when the parent can be considered "owner" or "operator") can both
be held responsible under CERCLA); CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 572 (holding par-
ent corporation may be liable for its subsidiary corporation under CERCLA in two
ways: it may be directly liable as "operator" or it may be liable through common
law principles of piercing corporate veil); Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 345 (hold-
ing parent corporation liable under CERCLA if parent corporation controlled or
participated in subsidiary's actions); Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26-27 (imposing liabil-
ity on a parent corporation as "operator" due to its "active involvement in the
activities of its subsidiary"); New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540, 547 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding corporation directly liable for wholly owned subsidiary's illegal dis-
posal of hazardous material).
8. FMC v. Aero Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
chief executive officer liable as "operator" under CERCLA); United States v. Caro-
lina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding corporation's
principals liable as "operators").
9. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842-43 (4th
Cir. 1992) (indicating former tenants can be held liable under CERCLA for dispo-
sal of underground storage tanks as long as authority to control facility was pres-
ent); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984
(D.S.C. 1986) (noting landowners who entered into lease with company which
stored hazardous waste could not avoid liability for cleanup costs).
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supervisors,1 0 excavators, "1 and state and local governments.1 2
Most recently, in FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce
(FMCII), 1 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
federal government's necessary regulatory activities during World
War II subjected the United States to liability as "operator" and "ar-
ranger" under CERCLA.14
Part II of this Note reviews the activities of the United States
which the Third Circuit considered in qualifying the government as
an "operator" under CERC[A. Part III discusses the statutory and
case law pertinent to CERCLA liability and governmental immunity.
Part IV explains the Third Circuit's reasoning and suggests that the
court overextended CERCLA liability, failing to fully consider the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Finally, Part V discusses the detri-
mental impact this case will have, concluding that Congress should
amend CERCLA to clarify the scope of the federal immunity
provision.
II. FACTS
In 1963, FMC Corporation (FMC) bought the 440 acre site at
issue, which is located in Front Royal, Virginia.15 American Viscose
Corporation (American Viscose) owned the facility from 1937 until
1963.16 In 1940, American Viscose constructed a plant on the site
10. Northeastern Pharmaceutica 810 F.2d at 743 (holding plant supervisor for
chemical manufacturer individually liable for having arranged for transportation
and disposal of hazardous substances where he had authority to control handling
and disposal of hazardous substances, and was directly responsible for arranging
for transportation and disposal of hazardous substances).
11. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338,
1343 (9th Cir. 1992) (indicating excavator who spread some displaced contami-
nated soil from property over to other parts of property was liable as "transporter'
under CERCLA even though material was not moved to separate parcel of land but
merely to another area of the same property).
12. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (noting CERCLA in-
tended to hold state governments liable in federal court). For a discussion of this
case, see infra note 43 and accompanying text.
13. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (FMCI1).
14. Id. at 834.
15. Id. at 835-36. The facility included a manufacturing plant and twenty
three waste disposal basins and landfill areas. Id. at 836. The plant was owned and
operated by FMC from 1963 to 1976, and by Avtex Fibers-Front Royal, Inc., from
1976 to 1989. Id. American Viscose is now out of business, and Avtex is undergoing
bankruptcy reorganization. FMC v. United States Dep't. of Commerce, 786 F.
Supp. 471, 472-73 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (FMC). Thus, FMC was left to seek contribution
from the government under CERCLA § 113(f)(1). FMCII, 29 F.3d at 835.
16. FMCI, 29 F.3d at 835.
1996] 159
3
Russo: FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce: An Overexpansi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
160 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAwJouRNAL [Vol. VII: p. 157
and began to manufacture textile rayon.17 After the bombing of
Pearl Harbor, the United States government determined that an
increase in the production of textile rayon was needed for the man-
ufacturing of war-related products.'8 As a result, the War Produc-
tion Board (WPB), 19 instructed American Viscose to convert its
plant for the production of high tenacity rayon.20
Several inspections of the site were conducted, assessing the
implementation of environmental controls. In 1982, these inspec-
17. Id. As of 1942, American Viscose "was the largest rayon producer in the
United States." FMCI, 786 F. Supp. at 475. Prior to the war, American Viscose had
manufactured only commercial textile rayon. Id. at 474.
18. Id. The Chairman of the War Productions Board (WPB) considered the
high tenacity rayon program extremely important and critical to the production
program. FMCI, 786 F. Supp. at 474.
19. Faced with the problem of mobilizing the economy for World War II,
Congress granted the Executive Branch the authority to do so. The President then
created the WPB by executive order in January of 1942. Exec. Order No. 9024, 7
Fed. Reg. 329 (1942). The WPB was dissolved after the war. Its functions were
transferred to the Civilian Production Administration. Later, its powers were trans-
ferred once again to the Secretary of Commerce (the defendant in FMC). Exec.
Order No. 9841, 12 Fed. Reg. 2645 (1947).
The WPB was granted broad power to assess defense needs and to create
methods for satisfying those needs. See An Act to Expedite National Defense, and
for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 76-671, 54 Stat. 676 (1940) ("The Priorities Stat-
ute"), as amended by Act of May 31, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-507, 56 Stat. 176 (1942)
(amending the Priorities Statute). The WPB was not "a procurement agency, but
was responsible for procurement policy."Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 13
Cl. Ct. 72, 88 (Cl. Ct. 1987), vacated on juris. grounds, 855 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
The WPB had the authority to: "increase, accelerate, and regulate the produc-
tion and supply of materials, articles, and equipment and the provision of emer-
gency plant facilities .. .required for the national defense" and to "[f]ormulate
plans for the mobilization for defense of the production facilities of the Nation,
and to take all lawful action necessary to carry out such plans." FMC, 786 F. Supp.
at 474 (quoting Exec. Order No. 8629, 6 Fed. Reg. 191 (1941)); see John L.
O'Brien & Manly Fleischmann, The War Production Board Policies and Procedures, 13
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 24-37 (1944).
20. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 835. Under the direction of WPB, facilities were re-
quired to fulfill government military contracts. The WPB could oversee the flow of
raw materials to ensure the adequacy of those materials to fill those military con-
tracts. See Priorities Statute, supra note 19, at 236. This was accomplished through a
series of federal regulations known as "Priorities Ranking System." Id. Under this
system, the WPB would review the supply and demand of any good that appeared
to be scant. Id. The Board also had the ability to make "program determinations."
These would establish how much of the good was needed and identify facilities to
help meet this need. See O'Brien & Fleischmann, supra note 19, at 20-21. These
facilities were then given priority in receiving crucial raw materials on the condi-
tion that those raw materials could be used only as directed by the WPB. If a com-
pany refused to conform to any WPB priority order or directive, its facility could be
seized by the government for fair market value. See Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885, 892 (1940).
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tions revealed serious environmental hazards on the site.21 The
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) subse-
quently began the necessary cleanup, notifying FMC of its potential
liability under CERCLA.22
FMC initiated and exclusively financed a site cleanup in 1988.
In 1990, FMC filed suit for contribution against the Department of
Commerce for its wartime activities under section 113(f) of CER-
CLA.2 3 FMC alleged that, as a result of the government's pervasive
regulations during World War II, the government was jointly liable
as "owner," "operator," and "arranger" under CERCLA.24 FMC ar-
gued that the government effectively operated the plant in conjunc-
tion with American Viscose, and therefore, should share in the
response costs. 25 On appeal, the Third Circuit held the govern-
ment liable as "operator" and "arranger."26
21. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 835. Carbon disulfide, a chemical used in the manufac-
turing of high tenacity rayon, was found in the ground water near the plant. Id.
Approximately 65,500 cubic yards of hazardous viscose waste was disposed of at the
facility in unlined basins during the war. Id. at 838.
22. Id. at 835. CERCLA authorizes EPA to take response action to minimize
and eliminate the dangers posed by threatened or actual releases of hazardous
substances. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). CERCIA also authorizes EPA
to clean up sites that pose "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health." CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). In doing so, the EPA has
two options. First, EPA may accomplish cleanup by compelling the parties respon-
sible for the site to undertake remedial measures. CERCLA § 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a) (1). SeeB.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992).
Second, EPA has the alternative of cleaning up the site itself by financing available
through "Superfund," and then suing the responsible parties for reimbursement.
This reimbursement then replenishes Superfund. CERCLA §§ 107(a) (4) (A), 111,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) (4) (A), 9611; see B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1197. Parties sued
by EPA can then recover a portion of their costs from other potentially liable par-
ties. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
23. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 835. CERCLA § 113(f) states that persons assessed with
response costs under CERCLA may "seek contribution from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title ..... CERCLA
§ 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
24. For a discussion of "owner" and "operator" liability, see supra note 6. For a
discussion of "arranger," see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
25. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 835.
26. Id. The district court held the government liable on all three theories: as
an "owner," "operator," and "arranger." FMC1, 786 F. Supp. at 481. On appeal, the
Third Circuit summarized the factual findings of the district court regarding the
activities of the government:
"(1) the government required American Viscose to stop making regular
rayon and start producing high tenacity rayon; (2) the government man-
dated the amount and specifications of the rayon produced and the sell-
ing price; (3) the government owned the equipment used to make the
high tenacity rayon and owned a plant used to make raw materials; (4)
the government supervised the production process through the enact-
ment of specifications and the placement of on-site supervisors and in-
spectors; it supervised the workers; and it had the power to fire workers
5
Russo: FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce: An Overexpansi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
162 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity, a long-standing principle of the American
government, shields the United States from civil and criminal liabil-
ity. 27 The United States, as sovereign, is "immune from suit save as
it consents to be sued."28 The consent cannot be implied, rather it
must be unequivocally expressed, 29 and waivers must be construed
narrowly in favor of the govemment.30 Thus, the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity imposes serious limitations on suits against the fed-
eral government.
or seize the plant if its orders were not followed; and (5) the government
knew the generation of waste inhered in the production process; it was
aware of the methods of disposal for the waste; and it provided the equip-
ment for the waste disposal."
FMCII, 29 F.3d at 838.
After making the factual findings and conclusions of law, the district court
ordered the case to trial to assess the liability of FMC and the government. Id.
However, the allocation issues were settled by the two parties, subject to the gov-
ernment's right to appeal the holding as "operator" and "arranger." Id. Under the
settlement agreement, the government is liable for eight percent of the cleanup
costs as "owner." Id. However, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's hold-
ing, thus, the government is liable for 26% of the cleanup costs. Id. Since the
government settled on the issue of "owner" liability, the Court of Appeals did not
address this issue. Id.
27. The first case addressing sovereign immunity was The Siren, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 152 (1868). In this case, the Supreme Court adopted the proposition that
permitting suits against the government, without the consent of the government,
would endanger public safety and hinder public services. Id. at 154. The Court
decided that public policy mandated the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
Court concluded that public welfare would be harmed if "the supreme authority
could be subjected to suit .... " Id.
Following Siren, the Court noted in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882),
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity had "always been treated as an established
doctrine." Today, the doctrine is such that for the United States to be sued, it must
have waived its immunity. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
Furthermore, the States are granted sovereign immunity through the Elev-
enth Amendment of the United States Constitution which states "[t]he judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI.
28. Testan, 424 U.S. at 399 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,
586 (1941)). See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (noting United
States may not be sued without its consent and existence of consent is a prerequi-
site for jurisdiction).
29. Testan, 424 U.S. at 399. See also Mitchell v. United States, 787 F.2d 466,
467 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating parties bringing action against United States bear
"burden on demonstrating an unequivocal waiver of immunity").
30. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 (1993); United States v. Nordic Village,
503 U.S. 30 (1992).
[Vol. VII: p. 157
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B. Congressional Waiver of Sovereign Immunity under CERCLA
1. Statutory Provisions
Section 107(a) of CERCLA defines the four types of liable par-
ties31 as: (1) "the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject
to jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility . ,";32 (2) "any
person who at time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of. . . -;33 (3) "any person who . . . arranged for disposal
or treatment. ... ,;34 and (4) "any person who accepts or accepted
any hazardous substances for transport. . . . "3 Congress then de-
fined "operator" circularly as "any person . . . operating such
facility."36
31. Generally, CERCLA liability attaches if: "1) a release of hazardous sub-
stance has occurred, 2) at a facility, 3) causing a plaintiff to incur response costs,
and 4) the defendant is a responsible party as defined under section 107(a)."
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); CPC Int 731 F. Supp. at
786.
The only defenses to liability under CERCLA are set forth in § 107(b). Section
107(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a per-
son otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the release of a hazardous substance and the damages
resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant ... if the defendant establishes ... that (a)
he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance con-
cerned ... and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
forcibly result from such acts or omission; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
32. CERCLA § 107(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
33. CERCLA § 107(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2).
34. CERCLA § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). This section provides:
"any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dispo-
sal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such per-
son, by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by
another person or entity and containing such hazardous substances, ...
Id.
35. CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4). This section provides "any
person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal
or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there is a re-
lease, or threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable ...." Id.
36. CERCLA § 101(20), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20).
1996]
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The United States government is included in the definition of
"person."37 Section 120(a)(1) of CERCIA provides that "[e]ach
department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (in-
cluding the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of govern-
ment) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same
manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substan-
tially, as any non-governmental agency."38 Section 101(20) (D) of
CERCLA sets forth exclusions for those liable for response costs as
an "owner" or "operator."39 Specifically, CERCLA excludes a state
or local government from liability when it involuntarily acquires land
subject to liability.4° Additionally, section 107(d) (2) of CERCLA
provides another exception to governmental immunity when a state
or local government acts in response to an emergency created by
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance. 41 This
emergency exception, however, does not apply if the state or local
government's action is grossly negligent or constitutes intentional
misconduct.42
2. Case Law Interpreting CERCLA's Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of state
liability under CERCLA in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company.43 In
Union Gas, the Court held that the language of CERCLA clearly es-
37. CERCIA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). The term "person" is defined
as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint
venture, commercial entity, United States Government, state, municipality, commis-
sion, political subdivision of a state, or any interstate body." Id. (emphasis added).
38. CERCLA § 120(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1).
39. CERCLA § 101 (20) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (D).
40. Id. The term does not include "a unit of State or local government which
acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily ac-
quires title by virtue of its functions as sovereign." Id.
41. CERCLA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d) (2). "No state or local govern-
ment shall be liable under this subsection for costs or damages as a result of ac-
tions taken in response to an emergency created by the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another
person." Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. "This paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as a
result of gross negligence or intentional misconduct by the State or local government
.... [R]eckless, willful, or wanton misconduct shall constitute gross negligence."
Id. (emphasis added).
43. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). In Union Gas, the United States reimbursed the State of
Pennsylvania for cleanup costs of a coal gasification plant, and then sued respon-
dent, the "operator" of the former facility, to recover response costs. Id. The "oper-
ator" then filed a third-party complaint against the State of Pennsylvania. Id. at 5-6.
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tablishes Congress's intent to hold states liable for damages. 44 The
Court looked solely to the plain language of sections 101 (20) (D) 45
and 101 (21)46 of CERCLA and concluded that these two sections
constitute a general congressional waiver of the states' immunity
when a state would otherwise qualify as a liable party under section
107(a). 47 Significantly, the Court noted in dicta that section
120(a) (1) constitutes a waiver of federal immunity where the fed-
eral government would otherwise be liable under section 107(a) .48
In United States v. Allied Corp.,49 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California held the United States Navy
liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs arising from a demolition
which caused the release of a hazardous substance on property it
owned.5 0 Thus, where the government takes actual ownership of a
site, its conduct mirrors that of a non-governmental entity, and it
may incur liability to the same extent as that entity.5 1
In contrast to the general waiver of state immunity established
by Union Gas, and to the more limited waiver of federal immunity
recognized in Allied Corp., an exception has developed, in conjunc-
tion with section 107(d) (2) of CERCLA, limiting the liability of
both state and federal governments acting in a regulatory capacity.
In United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chemicals, Inc.,5 2 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that the waiver of federal sovereign immunity under section 120 of
CERCLA does not extend to response or remedial actions under-
taken by EPA. 53 The court reasoned that "when the EPA under-
takes such actions, it is not acting as a private party; it is acting to
ameliorate a dangerous situation that, but for the prior actions of
the generators and transporters of the hazardous waste, would not
44. Id. at 5. In United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chemicals, Inc., 797 F.
Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1992), the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania noted that "the Union Gas Court did not hold that the waiver of
federal sovereign immunity under CERCIA was coextensive with the waiver of
state sovereign immunity." Atlas Minerals, 797 F. Supp. at 420 n.19.
45. CERCLA § 101(20) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (D). For a discussion of this
section, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
46. CERCLA § 101 (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). This section expressly includes
"States" in the definition of "person." See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
47. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 7-13.
48. Id. at 10 (dictum).
49. Nos. C-83-5898-FMS, C-83-5896-FMS, 1990 WL 515976, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 26, 1990).
50. Id. at *2-4.
51. See id.
52. 797 F. Supp. at 411.
53. Id. at 420-21.
1996]
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exist."54 Likewise, in United States v. Western Processing Co., 5 5 the
United States District Court in Washington at Seattle held there is
no federal waiver with respect to contribution claims based on regu-
latory activities. 56 Also, in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation,57
the federal government was held immune from CERCLA liability in
connection with cleanup activities at the Paoli Rail Yard.58 In In re
Paoli R.R Yard, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania specifically stated that the United States would
be liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA if it acted in a non-regu-
latory capacity.59 The court stated, "the United States is to contrib-
ute its share when it acts in a fashion analogous to that of a business
54. Id. at 421. See also Reading v. City of Phila., 155 B.R. 890 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(noting "[t] he reason that the waiver [of Sovereign Immunity] ... does not extend
to response or remedial actions taken by the EPA is that, when the EPA undertakes
such actions, it is not acting like a private party."). See also United States v. Shaner,
No. CIVA.85-1372, 1992 WL 154652, at * 1-11 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1992); In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 790 F. Supp. 94, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1992); United States v.
Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725, 728 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
55. 761 F. Supp. at 725. In Western Processing, the court held that the counter-
claims of RSR Corporation against the United States had to be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The court stated:
It cannot be argued with full conviction that the EPA, in carrying out its
duties under the statute, assumes the risk of becoming a liable party as an
Iowner/operator' under CERCLA Section 107, and the idea was rejected
by Congress. Moreover, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be based
on such tenuous ground as an implication, especially one of such ghostly
manifestation.
Id. at 729.
56. Id.
57. 790 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1992). In this case, the federal government
brought suit against the railroad transportation authority for claims arising under
CERCLA. Id. The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA)
then filed counterclaims against the federal government for the government's al-
leged contamination during the cleanup of the rail yard. Id. SEPTA sought contri-
bution and indemnification from the government for response costs incurred in
the cleanup of Paoli Rail Yard. Id. On the government's motion to dismiss, the
court held that the government did not become an "operator" under CERCLA,
and did not subject itself to liability when it undertook environmental cleanup
activities. Id. at 95-97.
58. Id. at 97.
59. Id. The court stated that "[t]he United States would be liable under sec-
tion 107(a) of CERCLA if it was acting in a manner other than its regulatory capac-
ity." Id.
10
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concern."60 Similarly, in United States v. Azrae, 61 the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland held that the federal gov-
ernment, as well as the individual states, were immune from claims
for contribution based on the regulatory activity of hiring a contrac-
tor to clean the site.62
Thus, judicial interpretation supports the view that Congress
intended to hold states liable in federal court for CERCLA dam-
ages. 63 Furthermore, in situations where the federal government
owns property and acts as a private entity, it may incur liability as
would any private entity.64 An important exception to these waiv-
ers has emerged, however, for both federal and state governments
when they act in a regulatory manner.65
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Third Circuit's Reasoning
The Third Circuit began its analysis in FMCII by acknowledg-
ing and describing the well-settled principles of sovereign immu-
60. In re Paoli R.R Yard, 790 F. Supp. at 97 (citing Western Processing, 761 F.
Supp. at 730). The court also noted that Congress specifically rejected an amend-
ment to CERCLA that would make government negligence a separate defense to
CERCLA liability. Id. The court stated that "allowing contribution counterclaims
in this situation would undermine Congress' intent to ensure that those who bene-
fit financially from a commercial activity should internalize the health and environ-
mental costs of that activity into the costs of doing business." Id. (citing Azrael, 765
F. Supp. at 1245).
61. 765 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Md. 1991). In Azrael the United States brought an
action against nine potentially liable parties to recover cleanup costs incurred by
the United States under CERCLA. Id. The United States was also seeking a declara-
tory judgement for future cleanup costs. Id. at 1241. The State of Maryland inter-
vened as a plaintiff claiming it also incurred cleanup costs, and seeking to recover
those cleanup costs under CERCILA and state law. Id.
The defendants, Edward Azrael, Harriet Azrael, and Cele Landay, American
Telegraph and Telephone Company, General Motors Corporation, Baltimore Gas
and Electric Company, Browning-Ferris, Inc., andJ. William Parker and Sons, Inc.,
filed counterclaims against the United States and Maryland alleging that they were
also potentially liable under CERCLA § 107(a) (3) as parties who arranged for the
disposal of hazardous substances at that site. Id. The United States arranged for its
contractors to disperse wastes containing hazardous substances over the facility. Id.
On the motion to dismiss the counterclaims, the court held that the United
States and individual states were immune from claims for contribution based on
the activities of contractors they had hired to clean the site. Id. at 1246.
62. Id.
63. For a discussion of state liability as interpreted by the Supreme Court, see
supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
64. For a discussion of judicial interpretation of federal liability, see supra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of this exception, see supra notes 52-64 and accompany-
ing text.
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nity.6 6 The court noted that the federal government is immune
from suit unless it consents to be sued, and that consent cannot be
implied. 67 In addition, the waivers must be construed narrowly in
favor of the government.68
The court then addressed the government's argument that the
CERCLA immunity waiver provision is restricted from being ap-
plied to regulatory activity, and the government's wartime produc-
tion was exactly this type of permitted activity. 69 The court found
support for the government's position in several cases. 70 In re Paoli
Railroad Yard PCP Litigation,71 United States v. Atlas Minerals and
Chemicals,72 and Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia,73 held that the
waiver of governmental immunity in section 120 of CERCLA did
not extend to situations where the government acts in a regulatory
capacity.7 4 The Third Circuit, however, concluded that regulatory
66. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 838.
67. Id. at 839 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (con-
sent must be "unequivocally" expressed)).
68. Id. (citing United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. 1893, 1896 (1993); United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (1992)).
69. FMCI, 29 F.3d at 839-40. The government argued that CERCLA § 120
pertaining to sovereign immunity did not constitute a waiver for claims arising out
of wartime regulatory activities. Id. at 835-36, 839.
The government originally filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the United
States could not have been an "operator" or an "arranger" for disposal under CER-
CLA because its activities were simply regulatory. Id. at 835. The district court re-
jected this argument, holding the United States liable. Id. at 836.
In a subsequent motion for partial summary judgment, the United States ar-
gued that sovereign immunity was not waived under CERCLA for purely regulatory
activities. Furthermore, the government argued that their activities during wartime
did not rise to the level of ownership or operation liability under CERCLA. Id. The
district court denied the motion, holding that there were unsettled material facts
regarding the "owner" and "operator" issues. Id. In March 1991, the district court
held a four day nonjury trial on the issues of liability. Id. The district court held
the government liable on all three theories. FMCI, 786 F. Supp. at 471.
The government contended that a per se rule had been established declaring
that regulatory activities could not generate CERCLA liability, since only a govern-
ment has the authority to regulate. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 839. In support of this provi-
sion, the government cited In re Paoli FLR. Yard, 790 F. Supp. at 95-96; Reading Co.
v. City of Phila., 155 B.R. 890, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1993); United States v. Atlas Minerals
and Chems., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1992). FMCII, 29 F.3d at 839.
70. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 71-74 and accompanying
text.
71. In re Paoli R.R. Yard, 790 F. Supp. at 94. For a discussion of this case, see
supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
72. Atlas Minerals, 797 F. Supp. at 411. For a discussion of this case, see supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
73. Reading, 155 B.R. at 890. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 54.
74. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 839 (quoting In re Paoli R.R Yard, 790 F. Supp. at 97
(the United States "would be liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA if it was act-
ing in a manner other than its regulatory capacity.")); (quoting Atlas Minerals, 797
F. Supp. at 420 (stating that "the waiver contained in [CERCLA § 120 (a) (1)] only
12
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activities on behalf of the government were not necessarily exempt
from the waiver provisions. The fact that the government, unlike a
private party, has the ability to regulate in this manner is not suffi-
cient to establish a per se rule in the government's favor. 75 The
court reached this conclusion by looking to the language of section
120(a) (1) of CERCLA, which does not explicitly state that regula-
tory activities cannot generate liability. 76 Instead, the provision
states that the government is liable in the same fashion, and to the
same degree, as a non-governmental entity.77 Relying on section
120(a) (1), the court noted that the government is liable when it
engages in activities that would make a private party liable if that
private party engaged in those same activities. 78 The court then
concluded that the government would be liable even if no private
party had the ability to engage in the activities the government
performed. 79
The Third Circuit justified its rationale through a literal read-
ing of the statute's language. 80 The court reasoned that this ration-
ale is consistent with CERCLA's purpose of making those
applies to situations in which the government has acted as a business," and "does
not extend to situations in which the EPA has undertaken response or remedial
actions at a hazardous waste site.")); (quoting Reading, 155 B.R. at 897 (indicating
that the "government, unlike private entities must act to remedy environmental
crises, a government cannot, in such circumstances be considered an owner, oper-
ator or arranger for CERCLA purposes.")).
75. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 840.
76. Id. (citing CERCLA § 120(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1)). For a discussion
of CERCLA § 120(a)(1), see supra text accompanying note 38.
77. CERCLA § 120(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1).
78. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 840.
79. Id. The court reasoned that:
Just as the government can be liable for hazardous wastes created at a
military base it owns, the government can be liable when it engages in
regulatory activities extensive enough to make it an operator of a facility
or an arranger of the disposal of hazardous wastes even though no private
party could engage in the regulatory activities at issue.
Id. (citing Allied, 1990 WL 515976, at *2-4).
The court noted that the United States Navy would be liable for cleanup of a
military base because a private party would be liable in the same situation, even
though a private party does not have the ability to own a military base. Id. Cf
Allied, 1990 WL 515976, at *2-4 (holding United States Navy liable under CERCLA
because it authorized demolition which caused release of hazardous substances).
80. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 840 (citing Alcan, 964 F.2d at 260). The court likened
this statutory interpretation to that used in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61 (1955). Id. In Indian Towing, the Supreme Court interpreted a similar
waiver provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act to waive sovereign immunity even
with respect to activities in which a private party could not take part. Id. The In-
dian Towing Court quoted the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, which states that
"[t]he United States shall be liable.. .in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
The FMCI court found Indian Towing controlling. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 840.
1996]
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responsible for the problems caused by disposal bear the costs of
rectifying the damage they produced. 81 While CERCLA specifically
lists three defenses to liability in section 107(b), regulatory activity
is not included.82 The court then asserted that its reasoning was
consistent with section 107(d) of CERCLA.83 Specifically, the court
found that since section 107(d) (2) expressly protects states and lo-
cal governments from liability for actions taken in response to an
emergency, these emergency response procedures were meant to
be treated differently than other governmental regulatory activi-
ties.84 Thus, section 107(d) (2) shields a state or local government
when responding to an emergency, and not "simply because it acts
in a regulatory capacity."85 The Third Circuit concluded that since
this distinction was made for state and local governments, it should
also apply to the federal government. 86
81. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 840 (quoting Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v.
Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting CERCLA's essential pur-
pose of "making those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions
they created.")).
The court also cited United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Md. 1991)
which stated that a party benefiting from commercial activity should internalize
health and environmental costs of the activity into the costs of doing business.
FMCII, 29 F.3d at 840 (citing Azrae4 765 F. Supp. at 1245); but see infra notes 145-46
and accompanying text.
82. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 841. The court compared this analysis to that in United
States v. Rohm & Haas Co. Id. (citing United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d
1265, 1276 (3d Cir. 1993)). The Rohm & Haas court refused to read the term
"removal" in CERCLA, as including governmental oversight of private remedial
actions, in part because the court found it important that Congress had specifically
left out any mention of oversight in the definition of removal. Id. Likewise, the
FMCIIcourt concluded that since it did not consider the term "removal" to include
unspecified conduct, it would not read a broad exception into §§ 107(b) or
120(a) (1). FMCII, 29 F.3d at 840.
For a full discussion of the defenses to CERCLA liability in § 107(b), see supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
83. FMCI, 29 F.3d at 841.
84. Id. "Congress's creation of an exception for cleanup activities by state and
local governments plainly shows that it intended to treat those activities differently
from other government activities." Id.
85. Id. The court stated that it was not suggesting that all of the cases the
government cited were decided incorrectly. Id. However, the court noted that
those cases all involved governmental regulatory activities undertaken solely to
cleanup hazardous materials. Id. at 840. According to the court, "CERCLA does
not intend to discourage the government from making cleanup efforts by making
the government liable for such efforts." Id.
86. Id. The court noted that "Congress intended to treat the federal govern-
ment in the same manner as state and local governments." Id. The court specifi-
cally highlighted that since the state and local governments do not have an
exception to the waiver for the consequences of regulatory conduct in general,
neither does the federal government. Id.
14
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The FMC court next addressed the issue of the location of the
waiver provision in the "Federal facilities" portion of the statute.8 7
The government contended that Congress waived governmental lia-
bility only for federally owned facilities since the waiver provision is
located in a section entitled "Federal facilities."8s The court, how-
ever, found this argument unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the
court noted that the language of section 120 does not limit applica-
tion of the waiver solely to situations in which the government is the
owner.8 9 Second, the court reasoned that, even though Congress
added section 120 in 1986 to address federal facilities, the original
version also waived immunity using very similar language, and it was
not located under a section entitled "Federal facilities." 90 Third,
the court stated that in 1986, when Congress moved the waiver
from section 107 to section 120, it maintained that the government
would still be exposed to liability under section 107. 91 The court
concluded that Congress did not limit the waiver's scope simply by
moving it to a new section.92 Rather, the court reasoned that Con-
gress moved the waiver section pursuant to a reorganization
scheme, and therefore, the waiver of immunity in section 120 ap-
plied to the government in this case. 93
87. Id.
88. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 842.
89. Id. The court noted that the section deals with the application of CER-
CIA to the federal government and not specifically to property owned by the fed-
eral government. Id. The language of the section "imposes liability on the
government to the same extent as liability is imposed on any 'nongovernmental
agency.'" Id. (quoting CERCLA § 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1)).
90. Id. The original version provided that "[e]ach department, agency, or in-
strumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and
to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any non-governmental
entity, including liability under this section." Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94
Stat. 2783 (1980)). This section was not linked to the federal facilities section since
that section did not exist in the original version. Id.
91. Id. The court reasoned that since this "liability under section" reference
was an exact counterpart to § 107 as originally enacted, Congress did not expressly
limit the scope of the waiver. Id.
92. Id. The court stated that it would be unreasonable to infer that Congress
would impliedly limit its section by moving it. Id.
93. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 842. The court stated:
Inasmuch as Congress did nothing in terms in 1986 to narrow its earlier
waiver of sovereign immunity, it would be unreasonable for us to infer
that it impliedly limited its original waiver by moving the waiver section.
Indeed, if anything, through its enactment of section 120, Congress reem-
phasized its intention that CERCLA be applied to the government.
Id.
The court also suggested that the government itself does not consider the
waiver limited to federal facilities. Id. at n.2. The court cited Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994). The facts of this case indicate that the
1996]
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Concluding that Congress did in fact statutorily waive govern-
mental immunity, the Third Circuit turned to the issue of whether
the government's activities would qualify it as an "operator" if the
government was a private party.9 The court affirmed the district
court's ruling that the government's activities qualified it as an "op-
erator."95 Although acknowledging the detrimental impact this de-
cision may have on the government, the court stated that it could
not be influenced by that factor.96 Ultimately, the court sought to
accurately apply principles of law.9 7
B. The Dissent
The dissent in FMCI argued that Congress did not waive sover-
eign immunity for the exclusive government activity of "coordinat-
ing and steering the country's private industries" for military
purposes during wartime.98 Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that
even if Congress had waived governmental immunity, the govern-
United States Air Force agreed to settle a suit that was brought by EPA. Id. Accord-
ing to Key Tronic Corp., the Air Force agreed to settle by paying EPA $1.45 mil-
lion. Id. EPA alleged that Air Force was liable for response costs because they were
one of numerous parties that used a site for disposal. This disposal later contami-
nated the water. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 842 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994)).
94. Id. at 843.
95. The court reached this determination by applying the "actual control" test
previously adopted by the Third Circuit in Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v.
Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1992). FMCI, 29 F.3d at 843. This test imposes
liability which is inconsistent with "traditional rules of limited liability for corpora-
tions," but instead, is consistent with "CERCLA's broad remedial purposes .... Id.
(quoting Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221). Under this test, a corporation is liable
for the environmental violations of another corporation if there is evidence that
the first corporation exercised "substantial control" over the other. Id. In applying
this test, the court concluded that the government had indeed acted as an opera-
tor. Id. at 843-45.'
The FMCII court similarly affirmed the district court's holding regarding ar-
ranger liability. Id. at 845-46. Since the court was equally divided on this point, the
court affirmed the judgment of the district court without discussion. FMCII, 29
F.3d at 846.
96. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 846. The court noted that the government's brief urged
that potential liability is "massive and far outpaces anything Congress could have
imagined, much less intended" when it adopted the waiver provision. Id. (citing
government's brief).
97. Id. The court noted that its approach was necessarily the same as that of
the Supreme Court when the Court responded to an argument that the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was being applied too broadly:
"this defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction
must lie with Congress." Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
499 (1985)).
98. Id. at 846 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
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ment's activities failed to establish "operator" status.9 9 The dissent
determined that the scope of the waiver should be narrowly con-
strued.1 00 The dissent agreed with the majority that the operation
of facilities such as a federal park or naval base would subject the
federal government to liability as an "owner." The dissent, how-
ever, disagreed with the majority by asserting that the regulation of
private parks, or other private facilities would not subject the gov-
ernment to liability as an "operator."1 01 In so concluding, the dis-
sent found the majority's interpretation of the waiver illogical.' 0 2
Under the majority's interpretation, if the government engages
in activities that would make a private party liable, the government
is liable even if a private party does not have the ability to partake in
those governmental activities.103 The dissent asserted that there are
certain activities that are inherent in the role of the government,
which no private party may duplicate and which, therefore, are ex-
cluded from the waiver.' 0 4 Mobilizing the economy for the war ef-
fort is an activity uniquely inherent to the government, and as such,
is excluded from the waiver provision.105
99. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 846. ChiefJudge Sloviter, along with Judges Cowen and
Roth, dissented on both the application of the waiver provision, and on the prem-
ise that even if the waiver was applied, the government's activities during World
War II would not qualify as an owner or operator of a facility. Id. at 847-51. Judge
Stapleton joined with respect only to the latter. Id. at 851-54.
100. Id. at 847 (citing Testan, 424 U.S. at 399).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The dissent compared this interpretation to saying that "birds are
required to have passports to fly across the borders of nations that require people
to have passports." Id.
104. FMCI, 29 F.3d at 847. The dissenters observed that while the Supreme
Court has not yet addressed the issue, courts have generally-held that a similar
waiver in the Federal Tort Claims Act does not extend to the government's regula-
tory power because there are no private analogs to this regulatory power. Id. (cit-
ing Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890, 905 (6th Cir. 1994); Akutowicz v. United
States, 859 F.2d 1122, 1126 (2d Cir. 1988); C.P. Chem. Co. v. United States, 810
F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1987); Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385, 390
(D.C. Cir. 1983); McMann v. Northern Pueblos Enters., 594 F.2d 784, 785-86 (10th
Cir. 1979)).
105. Id. The dissent did recognize that there may be some government activi-
ties which may be fairly included within the regulation realm that can be per-
formed by private parties. Id. The dissent noted that operation of a lighthouse is
one such activity. Id. (citing Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69).
In contrast, the dissent asserted that there are some regulatory activities that
are specifically reserved for the government and these are the regulatory activities
to which the waiver in CERCLA § 120 does not extend. Winning a war is one such
activity. Id. (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950) (holding
government not liable under Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to members of
the armed forces incident to service, in part because "no private individual has the
power to conscript or mobilize a private army with such authorities over persons as
the Government vests in echelons of command.")).
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The dissent also noted that the majority did not eliminate all
distinctions between private parties and the government.10 6 The
dissent contended that by recognizing an "implied" exception to
the waiver when the federal government acts with the purpose of
cleanup, and not recognizing any other exceptions, the majority ig-
nored other important obligations of the federal government
outside the environmental context. 107
The dissent also suggested that the location of the waiver
under the tide "Federal facilities" supports the proposition that the
waiver was meant to apply only to federally owned facilities.10 8 The
dissent asserted that the majority failed to consider the possibility
that Congress did in fact move the section for a reason. 10 9 Addi-
tionally, the dissent considered the legislative history of CERCLA,
which suggests Congress moved the waiver provision under the sec-
tion entitled "Federal facilities" to limit its scope. 110
Finally, the dissent reviewed the well-established principle that
if there is ambiguity in a waiver provision, that waiver must be nar-
Only the federal government had the power and ability to accomplish the
overarching goal of mobilizing the economy. Id. at 848. No private party had the
ability to engage in such an activity, and the majority offers "not one shred of
evidence that when Congress limited its waiver to actions for which a nongovern-
mental entity would be liable, it intended to waive liability for these activities." Id.
at 848-49.
106. Id. at 848.
107. Id. The dissent then noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that
the government had a "primary obligation to bring about whatever production of
war equipment and supplies shall be necessary to win a war." Id. (quoting Lichter
v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1948)).
108. Id. at 849. The dissent stated:
[W]hen the government undertakes to respond to society's problems
through operation of its own facilities (as distinguished from regulating
the conduct of others), for example a government hospital, prison or
military base, that its activities are analogous to those of private parties,
and it is consequently subject to 'operator' liability under CERCLA.
Id.
According to the dissent, studies suggest that there are numerous government
facilities dangerous enough to be included in CERCLA liability. Id. (citing Stan
Millan, Federal Facilities and Environmental Compliance: Toward a Solution, 36 Loy. L.
REv. 319, 321-24 (1990); 57 Fed. Reg. 31,758 (July 17, 1992)).
109. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 848. The dissent explained that reading the waiver
provision in this light does not nullify it. Id. According to the dissent, this reading
of the waiver is rooted in the statute itself. Id.
110. Id. See 132 CONG. Rxc. 28,413 (1986) (statement of Senator Stafford)
(suggesting that § 120 exists to deal with "two to three potentially hazardous sites
at each of 473 military bases across the country," and "sites operated by the Depart-
ment of Energy"); 131 CONG. Rxc. 24,733 (1985) (statement of Senator Wil-
son) (stating that military bases are primary target when talking about "federal
facilities").
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rowly construed in favor of the United States."' There is more
than one plausible interpretation of the waiver, with no compelling
evidence to demonstrate that Congress unmistakably intended gov-
ernmental liability in this particular scenario, thus the waiver
should be limited. 1 2
C. The Third Circuit's Overexpansion of "Operator" Liability
under CERCLA
In attempting to effectuate the goals of CERCLA," 3 the Third
Circuit effectively undermined the well settled principles of federal
sovereign immunity.114 By concentrating on expanding "operator"
liability under CERCLA," 5 the Third Circuit has initiated the ero-
sion of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity.11 6
The majority opinion stated that since section 120(a) (1) pro-
vides that the government is liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as any non-governmental entity, the government is also
liable when it engages in an activity that a non-governmental entity
is unable to engage in.117 The court took this step without consid-
ering the strict requirements of sovereign immunity. Although the
111. FMCI, 29 F.3d at 850. (quoting United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. 1893,
1896 (1993)). "The foregoing [interpretations] are assuredly not the only read-
ings of [the provision], but they are plausible ones which is enough to establish
that a reading imposing monetary liability on the Government is not "unambigu-
ous" and therefore should not be adopted." Id.
112. Id. at 851. According to the dissent, "it is difficult to imagine that by the
words of section 120 Congress intended to impose massive liability on the United
States for the environmental consequences of this regulation .... without some
reference in the legislative history to its intent to do so." Id.
The dissent then discussed the idea that even if the waiver is not limited, the
government's activities during World War II should not qualify it as an operator.
Id. The dissent concluded that an examination of the relevant facts demonstrated
that the governmental activities relied on by the district court and the majority are
insufficient to qualify the government as an operator. Id. at 851-54.
113. The primary goal of CERCIA is to place the burden of cleanup on the
responsible parties. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of the applicable sovereign immunity principles, see
supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of courts employing a broad definition of "operator,"
see supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of the erosion of the doctrine of federal sovereign im-
munity, see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the majority opinion on the issue of governmental
liability in comparison to non-governmental liability, see supra notes 78-79 and
accompanying text.
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court's reasoning was, in itself, logical, the doctrine specifically pre-
cludes this type of conclusion. 118
The Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as requiring an unequivocal waiver of immunity by the
government in order to be sued. 119 This unequivocal standard also
mandates that a waiver be construed narrowly in favor of the fed-
eral government. 20 The Supreme Court recently reiterated this
rule of strict construction when it remarked that if language in a
waiver is susceptible to more than one reading, it is not "unambigu-
ous," and thus, does not qualify as an effective waiver. 21 The lan-
guage of section 120122 indicates that the express waiver contains
some limitation. 23 As the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania in In re Paoli RR. Yard noted, although
" '[t] here is no question that Congress expected government agen-
cies to shoulder their proportionate share of CERCLA response
costs when they have acted as owners, operators, generators, or
transporters,'" the waiver of sovereign immunity under section
120(a) of CERCLA is "limited only to circumstances under which a
private party could also be held liable."124 The language in section
120 holding the government liable "to the same extent as any non-
governmental entity"1 25 limits that waiver to activities that a private
party could in fact undertake. 26 The government may be treated as
the equivalent of a private party for purposes of CERCLA liability,
118. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, calls for a narrow interpretation of waivers in favor of the govern-
ment. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
119. Testan, 424 U.S. at 399 (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4
(1957)).
120. United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. at 1896 (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 112
S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991)).
121. United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 34-37 (1992).
122. For a discussion of this waiver, see supra text accompanying note 38.
123. Van S. Katzman, The Waste of War: Government CERCLA Liability at World
WarlIFacilities, 79 VA. L. REv. 1191, 1205 (1993) (discussing limitation of the statu-
tory waiver of sovereign immunity).
124. In re Paoli RK Yard, 790 F. Supp. at 96 (quoting United States v. Skipper,
781 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (E.D.N.C. 1991)). The court in Atlas Minerals specifically
cites FMCI, as an example of the government acting as a business. Atlas Minerals,
797 F. Supp. at 420 (citing FMCI, 786 F. Supp. 485-86). See also Azrael, 765 F. Supp.
at 1244-45; Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. at 729-30; United States v. Hardage,
32 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1059, 1061 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 22, 1989); B.R. MacKay &
Sons v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1296 & n.9 (D. Utah 1986).
125. CERCLA § 120(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1). For a discussion of this
section, see supra text accompanying note 38.
126. Katzman, supra note 123, at 1205. These limiting words suggest the gov-
ernment may not be held liable for activities in which private parties could not also
be deemed liable. Id.
20
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss1/6
FMC CoRp.
but may not be held liable in situations where private parties could
not also be deemed liable. 12 7
Section 120 is further limited by the title "Federal facilities."128
This title suggests that the waiver applies only to those facilities that
are actually owned by the government.129 The majority in FMCII
stated that the waiver was placed in this section simply for conve-
nient ordering of the statute.130 As the dissent noted, however, it is
possible that Congress re-ordered the statute in an effort to limit
the waiver.131 Furthermore, legislative history additionally supports
this conclusion.' 3 2
In support of its rationale that the waiver is broad, the Third
Circuit relied on a distinguishable district court case. In United
States v. Allied Corp.,133 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held the government liable as an
"owner" for contamination.13 4 However, in Allied Corp., the govern-
ment actually owned the land, where in FMCII, the government did
not. This is an important distinction based upon the fact that the
CERCLA waiver provision is contained in a section entitled "Federal
facilities."
Even if this statute is not limiting, it is, at the least, ambigu-
ous. 13 5 The statute is clear to the extent that if the government acts
in a way which would impose liability on a private party, it too is
127. Id. The vast majority of federal courts that have considered the text of
§ 120 have determined that the section is "carefully limited." Id. (citing Hardag, 32
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1061). See e.g., Atlas Minerals, 797 F. Supp. at 420
("Although [section 120] does contain a waiver of sovereign immunity, that waiver
is limited.").
128. CERCLA § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 9620.
129. See FMCII, 29 F.3d at 849 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). The dissent asserted
that "[t]he placement and title of the sovereign immunity waiver in section 120
entitled 'Federal facilities' lends support to the government's proposition that the
provision was intended only to ensure CERCLA liability for hazardous waste gener-
ated at federally-owned or federally-operated facilities." Id.
130. For a discussion of this part of the opinion, see supra notes 88-93 and
accompanying text.
131. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 849 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). The dissent stated that
"the majority fail[ed] to consider the likelihood that the new placement was in-
tended to clarify the scope of the waiver." Id.
132. Id. According to the dissent, "remarks by senators contemporaneous to
the legislation that placed the waiver under the 'Federal facilities' designation sug-
gest that this is indeed Congress's view of the scope of the waiver, and the majority
points to nothing to the contrary in the legislative record." Id.
133. Allied Corp., 1990 WL 515976, at *2. For a discussion of this case, see
supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
134. Allied Corp., 1990 WL 515976, at *7.
135. Katzman, supra note 123, at 1205. The fact that courts disagree on the
appropriate interpretation of the statute supports the conclusion that it is ambigu-
ous. Id. at 1205 n.104.
19961
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liable.13 6 The statute is ambiguous as to the proper result when the
federal government engages in activity which is outside the author-
ity of non-govemmental entities.1 37 The statute is clear to the ex-
tent that when the government owns the land it is liable.' 38 The
statute is ambiguous as to what happens when the site at issue is not
a "Federal facility." In light of the well-established doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity,'3 9 this apparent ambiguity in the waiver must be
construed in favor of limiting, rather than expanding, the waiver. ' 40
The district courts that have limited the waiver have consistently
relied on these sound sovereign immunity principles.' 41 There is a
basic assumption in American law that when the federal govern-
ment acts in a policymaking capacity, it is immune from liability for
damages.' 42 If Congress intended to override this assumption in
CERCLA, it would have explicitly waived governmental
immunity.143
The Third Circuit considered its holding consistent with the
goals of CERCLA. In particular, the court emphasized the goal of
making those responsible for the waste pay for cleanup."44 The
court, however, did not balance the policy reasoning behind that
goal: that the costs of cleanup should be internalized through the
company. 145 Of importance is the fact that the government re-
136. CERCIA § 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).
137. Since the statute specifically addresses the situation where the govern-
ment acts in the same manner as a nongovernmental agency, but does not address
the situation where the government acts as only a government can, it is ambiguous.
See CERCLA § 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).
138. The statute would be unambiguous when the government owns the land
for two reasons. First, owning the land is an activity that a nongovernmental agency
could take part in, and if it did, the agency too would be liable. See CERCLA § 120,
42 U.S.C. § 9620. Second, if the government owned the land, the land would then
be a "Federal facility." See CERCILA § 120(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (2).
139. For a discussion of the applicable sovereign immunity principles, see
supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
140. If a waiver is ambiguous it must be construed in favor of the government.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
141. See cases cited supra note 124.
142. See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. Rzv.
1529, 1532-33 (1992) (stating Congress may conclude harm to policymaking in
damage actions outweighs benefits of added deterrence for conduct by
government).
143. Katzman, supra note 123, at 1196.
144. FMCII, 29 F.3d at 840.
145. CERCLA's purpose is to ensure that sites contaminated by hazardous
substances are cleaned up and that persons handling or using hazardous sub-
stances internalize the full costs those substances impose on society and on the
environment. A fundamental principle of CERCLA is that "those who benefit fi-
nancially from commercial activity [should] internalize the health and environ-
ment costs of that activity into the costs of doing business." S. REP. No. 848, 96th
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ceived no profits from its regulatory activities, and therefore, would
have no way of internalizing those cleanup costs. On the other
hand, American Viscose increased its profits by 300% during the
war. 146
In addition to undermining the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, the Third Circuit ignored other important obligations of the
federal government outside the environmental arena.147 For in-
stance, the war effort is certainly a necessary facet of the federal
government's powers.1 48 Whether the government should be re-
sponsible for these necessary regulatory activities is a policy decision
that should ultimately be deferred to Congress.
V. IMPACT
The implications of this decision are readily apparent. The
FMCII decision represents the first case in which a court has held
the federal government liable as an "operator" under CERCILA sec-
tion 107 at a facility not wholly owned by the government. Given
the federal government's control over much of the nation's econ-
omy during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and
to a lesser extent, the Persian Gulf War, the number of waste sites
for which the government may be required to contribute to
cleanup costs is enormous.1 49 In the context of World War II alone,
the government fears that if the FMCIIholding is taken to its logical
extreme, the United States could be deemed liable "for all indus-
trial waste produced from 1942-1945 by nature of its regulation or
its authority to take over plants when that authority went unexer-
cised."' 50 This case alone will cost the government between
$26,000,000 and $78,000,000.151 This case has paved the way for
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in 1 Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. Thus, Congress intended that
"the listed potentially liable parties should assume clean-up responsibility as a part
of their cost of doing business." Id. See also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
964 F.2d 252, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1992); Atlas Minerals, 797 F. Supp. at 413; State of
Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
146. Reply Brief for the Federal Appellants at 14 n.11, FMC Corp. (No. 92-
1945) (citing documents revealing profit increase at Front Royal site from
$339,148 in 1940 to $1,080,000 in 1944).
147. FMCdI, 29 F.3d at 848 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. See Mark A. Hofmann, Court Holds US. Liable for Superfund Cleanup, Bus.
INS., Mar. 2, 1992, at 1.
150. Defendant's Pretrial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 69, FMC
Corp. (No. 90-1761).
151. FMCU, 29 F.3d at 838.
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enormous governmental liability which will ultimately be paid with
taxpayer dollars.
Perhaps more importantly, the Third Circuit expanded the
scope of "operator" liability under CERCLA at the expense of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. In an effort to reach the "deep
pockets," 152 the court has expanded an ambiguous, if not limited,
waiver, thereby undermining the long-standing principle of the sov-
ereign immunity that a waiver must be "unequivocally
expressed."153
The issue in this case is rooted in a policy argument which
Congress must resolve. The decision to waive governmental immu-
nity must be made by Congress, therefore, Congress must also de-
cide the scope of those waivers. Congress must unambiguously state
the extent of liability to be placed on the government when it acts
in a regulatory manner during wartime.
Tricia R. Russo
152. Rena I. Steinzor & Matthew F. Lintner, Should Taxpayers Pay the Cost of
Superfund?, 22 ENV-L. L. REp. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,089 (Feb. 1992) (stating third
parties may have played only a trivial role in contamination of the site, but their
"deep pockets" make them popular for cost-sharing purposes). Much of the CER-
CLA litigation represents an attempt to shift the overwhelming costs of Superfund
liability onto third parties or the public, rather than to pinpoint the "truly respon-
sible parties." Id. See Anne D. Webber, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the
Costs of CERCA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1469, 1493-97 (1989).
153. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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